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Eurasian penduline tits (Remiz pendulinus) have an unusually diverse breeding system 24 
consisting of frequent male and female polygamy, and uniparental care by the male or the 25 
female. Intriguingly, 30–40% of all nests are deserted by both parents. To understand the 26 
evolution of this diverse breeding system and frequent clutch desertion, we use six years of 27 
field data to derive fitness expectations for males and females depending on whether or not 28 
they care for their offspring. The resulting payoff matrix corresponds to an asymmetric 29 
Snowdrift Game with two alternative evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs): female-only and 30 
male-only care. This, however, does not explain the polymorphism in care strategies and frequent 31 
biparental desertion, since theory predicts that one of the two ESSs should have spread to fixation. 32 
We argue that the average population payoff matrix gives a poor representation of individual 33 
conflicts. If individuals differ in their payoff matrices, their decisions may depend on their own 34 
fitness prospects rather than on the population average. Using bootstrapping, we demonstrate 35 
that taking account of individual variation in payoffs explains the patterns of care better than a 36 
model based on population payoffs. Our work highlights the need for a new generation of 37 
individual-based evolutionary game-theoretic models.  38 
 39 
Keywords: cooperation, Snowdrift Game, evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable 40 
strategy, nest desertion, sexual conflict 41 
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1. INTRODUCTION 42 
Decisions about parental care are among the most important life-history decisions that 43 
animals face. Across vertebrates a diversity of parental care systems exists, ranging from 44 
cooperative breeding with biparental care and helpers, such as in meerkats (Suricata suricatta 45 
[1] and long-tailed tits (Aegithalos caudatus [2]), to limited (or no) parental care, such as in 46 
precocial birds and many fish species [3-5]. The fitness consequences of parental care decisions 47 
depend on the social and non-social environment [3,5-7] and strongly reflect the trade-off 48 
between investment in the current brood and investment in future survival and reproduction [3; 49 
8; 9]. Although both parents have a shared interest in their current brood, there is conflict 50 
between them because each individual would prefer its mate to provide the majority of 51 
parental care [5,9,10]. 52 
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful approach for studying cooperation and conflict in a 53 
coherent framework [11,12], and it has often been used to model parental care decisions (e.g. 54 
[13-18]). With a few notable exceptions [19,20], most published parental care models are 55 
conceptual and not directly tailored to a specific empirical system. Attempts to test 56 
theoretical predictions have focused primarily on biparental care, examining how a parent 57 
responds to its local circumstances and the parental effort of its mate (e.g. [21-23]). 58 
Realistic game-theory models for the interactions between parents involved in biparental 59 
care have to consider how such behavioural interactions may depend on individual traits 60 
and environmental variables, and how the outcome of the interactions may change over 61 
time. This makes the models and their solutions inherently intricate [13,16]. Furthermore, 62 
model predictions are often sensitive to their specific assumptions (e.g. [13]), so for 63 
accurate tests of care models it is particularly important to validate the underlying 64 
theoretical assumptions. 65 
Testing models of parental care might be easier in systems that are not restricted to 66 
biparental care, but have a polymorphic pattern of care. Several species of vertebrates 67 
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exhibit a combination of male-only, female-only and biparental care within the same population 68 
(e.g. [24-26]). Here we focus on the Eurasian penduline tit (Remiz pendulinus), in which male-69 
only care, female-only care and biparental desertion all occur within the same population [27, 28]. 70 
Full incubation and feeding of nestlings is carried out by one parent only. In our study population 71 
in southern Hungary, 45.0% of all nests are cared for by the female alone, 16.7% are cared for by 72 
the male alone and 38.3% are deserted by both parents [29]. Biparental care is never observed. 73 
Despite large geographic distances and substantial variation in breeding density and other 74 
ecological variables, this pattern of care is consistent across five populations of penduline tits in 75 
distant locations in Europe [29] (Electronic Supplementary Information [ESM] S1). 76 
The diverse care pattern in penduline tits, in particular the high frequency of nest 77 
desertion, is likely the result of sexual conflict between the two parents [28,30,31]. One 78 
parent is able by itself to incubate the clutch and feed all the nestlings until independence 79 
[32,Pogány et al. in prep.], giving each parent an incentive to desert the nest. Nest desertion 80 
puts the deserted partner in a difficult situation (a “cruel bind” [33]): even if uniparental care 81 
is costly, the deserted partner has a strong incentive to stay, since deserting as well would 82 
condemn the offspring to death. Nevertheless, the deserted partner may also leave the nest if 83 
desertion is associated with higher fitness expectations than continuing to care for the current 84 
brood [34]. Game-theory models show that sexual conflict over parental care can indeed 85 
result in biparental desertion, or in uniparental care and an associated arms race for being the 86 
first to desert [35]. 87 
Our objective here is to apply these game-theoretic concepts to a particularly well-88 
studied wild population of Eurasian penduline tits, in which males and females may have up 89 
to six mates in a single breeding season [28]. Based on six years of data from this population, 90 
we estimate the fitness consequences for both males and females of caring for the offspring or 91 
deserting the nest. Using these estimates we calculate a payoff matrix, from which we derive 92 
the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for each sex. We show that the resulting ESS 93 
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predictions do not explain the variation in parental care observed in the field. We argue that 94 
this is because the average payoff matrix for the population gives a poor representation of the 95 
conflict faced by each pair of penduline tits, which is likely to depend on their individual 96 
characteristics. We therefore investigate the possibility that the variation in care patterns is 97 
caused by individual variation in payoffs [36]. By incorporating individual variation we can 98 
account better for population-level patterns of parental care. Throughout, we discuss the 99 
difficulties of applying simple payoff matrices to real populations with substantial individual 100 
variation, and argue that evolutionary models should aim to take a more realistic approach by 101 
modelling individual variation. 102 
 103 
2. ESTIMATING PAYOFFS 104 
(a) Study site and data collection 105 
We studied Eurasian penduline tits during the breeding season between April and August in 106 
six consecutive years (2002–2007) at a 1,321 ha fishpond system, Fehértó, in southern Hungary 107 
(46º19’N 20º6’E). Each year, 41–116 ringed males and 15–51 ringed females bred at this site 108 
[28]. The male bias in the number of ringed individuals reflects the fact that females are more 109 
difficult to trap than males, rather than a genuine bias in population sex ratio. Males were 110 
usually trapped before incubation using mist nets, whereas females were usually trapped at the 111 
nest during incubation. We searched for nest-building penduline tits and then visited each 112 
nest roughly every two days [37] to determine the date of nest initiation, date of pair 113 
formation, number of eggs (between the sixth and the ninth (median = eighth) day after the 114 
start of incubation), date of desertion, identity of the parent attending the nest and the number 115 
of nestlings (ten days after hatching of the first egg; the number of nestlings on the tenth day 116 
after hatching is highly correlated with the number of fledglings [37,38]). Adults were 117 
trapped and ringed with one metal ring and a unique combination of three colour rings (A.C. 118 
Hughes, Middlesex, UK). Standard biometric measurements were taken, as well as digital 119 
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photographs of each side of the bird’s head to quantify the size of the ‘mask’, signalling 120 
attractiveness (see [38,39] for details). The pattern of nest desertion in our population did not 121 
differ between nests where neither parents was trapped and those where at least one of the 122 
parents was trapped (multinomial logistic regression; χ2 = 3.932, df = 2, P = 0.140, n = 389 123 
nests), suggesting that trapping did not influence the probability of desertion. Adult return rates 124 
between years are low (5% for males, 2% for females [40]). To avoid pseudoreplication, we 125 
randomly selected data from only one season per colour-ringed individual, giving a total 126 
sample of 337 nests from 172 individuals). The composition of pairs was nearly always 127 
different between subsequent clutches: out of 194 colour-ringed pairs that produced a clutch 128 
between 2002 and 2007, only six pairs (3.1%) kept the same mate between successive nests 129 
(for further details on fieldwork see [28]). The pattern of parental care for these six pairs (50% 130 
female-only care, 10% male-only care, and 40% biparental desertion) did not appear to differ from 131 
that observed at the population level.  132 
 133 
(b) Fitness consequences of care and desertion 134 
Throughout this paper, we focus on parental care or desertion decisions concerning each 135 
individual’s first breeding attempt in the season. Since incubation and nestling feeding 136 
take about 34 days [41], caring for the first brood severely constrains the opportunities for 137 
subsequent breeding (Table 1a). To estimate the contribution of the first clutch to parental 138 
fitness, we calculated the average number of eggs and nestlings for all nests that were 139 
initiated before 6 June, depending on the parental care category (female-only care, male-140 
only care, biparental desertion) of the nest (Table 1a). The cut-off date corresponds to the 141 
midpoint of the interval between the nest initiation date of the first and second nest of 142 
ringed males (mean ± SD between males: 3 June ± 22.7 days (n = 267 males), 8 June ± 143 
21.1 days (n = 101 males), respectively). If a given individual had more than one nest 144 
before 6 June, we only selected the earliest nest in the season as its first nest. 145 
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Our data on first clutches are in line with previous studies of penduline tits [28,29]. 146 
Nest desertion takes place during the egg-laying phase. If the male deserts first, the female 147 
often lays two or three additional eggs, so that female-only cared clutches are 148 
significantly larger than those cared for by males and those deserted by both parents 149 
(Table 1a). In biparentally deserted nests all offspring die, whereas offspring survival (i.e. 150 
survival from hatching until 10 days after hatching) does not differ between male-only and 151 
female-only cared clutches (binary logistic regression including parental care category, clutch 152 
size, egg-laying date, year and the interaction between parental care category and clutch size 153 
as fixed effects; χ2 = 1.458, P = 0.227, n = 142 nests; Pogány, Á. et al. unpublished data). The 154 
reproductive success of males may be inflated (or deflated) by the occurrence of extra-pair 155 
young; in this system, about 24% of all offspring are sired by an extra-pair male [42]. 156 
However, the percentage of extra-pair young does not differ between nests cared for by the 157 
male and those deserted by him, nor between nests cared for by the female and those 158 
deserted by her [42]. Therefore, extra-pair paternity is unlikely to bias our results.  159 
The data on first broods within a season were based on 115 nests for which the 160 
parental care category was known. For 172 ringed birds (111 males and 61 females) 161 
involved in successful breeding attempts at these nests, the parental care category of their 162 
first nest of the season could be determined (‘successful’ meaning that pair formation and 163 
egg laying took place). For each combination of sex (male, female) and parental care 164 
category (male-only care, female-only care, biparental desertion), we calculated the 165 
percentage of birds involved in a second successful breeding attempt and the mean number 166 
of subsequent nests established by those birds. Males may only care for one brood in a 167 
breeding season, whereas females may care for up to two broods. The difference between males 168 
and females in the probability of having a subsequent successful nest after providing parental care 169 
(0.06 for males versus 0.38 for females; Table 1a) is largely due to the fact that males often care 170 
near the end of the breeding season [28,43]. Additionally, males who deserted their first nest were 171 
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less likely to have a subsequent successful nest if the female had also deserted (probability = 0.34) 172 
than if she had stayed behind to provide care (0.74; Table 1a). This might suggest that males at 173 
nests that are biparentally deserted are of lower quality and/or less attractive. Previously we 174 
showed that the size of a male’s eye-stripe or ‘mask’ indicates his attractiveness [38,39], but mask 175 
size was not different between males whose nest was deserted by both parents and males at nests 176 
where either the male or the female provided care (binary logistic regression; model effect 177 
estimate ± SE = 1.025 ± 0.912, Wald statistic = 1.262, df = 1, P = 0.261, n = 88 males). Tarsus 178 
length, wing length, and body mass of males were also not different between these two categories 179 
of nests (P > 0.331). Additionally, at the second nest in a season the pattern of parental care for 180 
males was not different from that observed at the population level (Table 3b) if his first nest was 181 
cared for by the female (χ2 = 0.211, P = 0.900, n = 34 males) or was biparentally deserted (χ2 = 182 
1.186, P = 0.553, n = 31 males). This suggests that the breeding experience of males did not 183 
predict the likelihood of biparental desertion of a subsequent nest. 184 
Based on all penduline tits within a category (i.e., including those birds that did not 185 
establish a second nest), we calculated the average number of eggs and nestlings produced 186 
during subsequent breeding attempts (Table 1a). If the number of eggs and/or nestlings could 187 
not be determined, it was estimated as the population mean of nests with the corresponding 188 
parental care category (male-only care: 3.67 eggs and 2.22 nestlings; female-only care: 5.80 189 
eggs and 3.07 nestlings; biparental desertion: 2.93 eggs and 0 nestlings; neggs = 371 nests and 190 
nnestlings = 194 nests). Overall, we estimated reproductive success for 77 out of a total of 339 191 
clutches (22.7%) and for 33 out of 336 broods (9.8%).  192 
Finally, we calculated the seasonal reproductive output for each parental category, 193 
by adding up the average number of nestlings in the first and subsequent nests (Table 1a). 194 
To check the consistency of our calculations of parental strategy-dependent seasonal 195 
reproductive output, we also determined the total number of nestlings produced over the 196 
season by the 172 ringed penduline tits, separately for males and females in each care 197 
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category of their first nest. For all six categories, the reproductive output of the colour-198 
ringed penduline tits we followed throughout the breeding season was almost identical to 199 
that in Table 1a. 200 
 201 
3. GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS 202 
(a) No individual variation in payoffs 203 
The seasonal reproductive output given in the penultimate row of Table 1a corresponds to the 204 
total number of nestlings shown in the payoff matrix for the parental care categories in Table 1b. 205 
A male who cared for the offspring in his first nest produced more nestlings over the course 206 
of the season (2.20 ± 1.40) than a male whose first nest was biparentally deserted (1.54 ± 2.54; 207 
Mann-Whitney U test: U = 257.5, P = 0.009, n = 65, Cohen’s d = 0.878, 1−β = 0.88). In 208 
contrast, a female who cared for the offspring in her first nest did not produce significantly 209 
more nestlings over the course of the season (4.58 ± 2.62) than a female whose first nest was 210 
biparentally deserted (2.35 ± 2.90; U = 93.5, P = 0.108, n = 58, d = 1.120, 1−β = 0.70). Note, 211 
however, that we only had six females in the latter category. 212 
Pairs rarely produced multiple clutches together (see § 2(a); [39]). We therefore 213 
assume that penduline tits play a single-shot game with two alternative actions: care or 214 
desert. An influential single-shot game from the game-theoretic literature is the Prisoner’s 215 
Dilemma. In this game, each player may either cooperate or defect, but the best response to any 216 
action by the opponent is to defect [44-47]. Thus the Prisoner’s Dilemma characterises a 217 
situation in which cooperative behaviour is vulnerable to exploitation by non-cooperators, 218 
eventually leading to an equilibrium in which no one cooperates. Despite the high frequency of 219 
nest desertion in penduline tits, Table 1b suggests that desertion is not the dominant strategy: if 220 
the male deserts, the female does best by caring, whereas if the female deserts, the male does 221 
best by caring. Thus, penduline tits do not appear to be playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma at the 222 
population level. An alternative possibility is the Snowdrift Game, in which cooperation is 223 
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beneficial for both players but the costs of cooperating depend on the opponent’s strategy [48-224 
50]. This is also true for parental care. Since parental care is an asymmetric game between 225 
two types of players, namely males and females, the game in Table 1b may reflect an 226 
asymmetric Snowdrift Game (cf. ‘Battle of the Sexes’ [51]). Although in asymmetric games an 227 
ESS can never be a mixed strategy [52], the asymmetry (male versus female) may be used to 228 
settle the conflict: each of the ESSs, corresponding to the two forms of unilateral cooperation 229 
(i.e. male-only care and female-only care), may be viewed as a convention. Although either 230 
convention is evolutionarily stable once it is adopted by the whole population, the problem 231 
remains which one will be reached in the course of evolution. Both players agree that 232 
unilateral cooperation would be best, but they differ in which of the two ESSs they prefer.  233 
If one of the ESSs is payoff dominant [53]—in that the payoff to each player is at 234 
least as great as the payoff it would get at the alternative ESS—then an obvious solution is to 235 
adopt that ESS. In terms of the average reproductive payoffs in our dataset, female-only care is 236 
more profitable for both sexes than male-only care (Table 1b), and thus female-only care is the 237 
payoff-dominant ESS. However, the predicted outcome of female-only care is inconsistent with 238 
the observed behaviour. Why is it that some pairs exhibit male-only care, when female-only care 239 
apparently gives a higher payoff for both sexes? And if the parents coordinate their actions, why 240 
do we still observe such a high frequency of biparental desertion (28–44%; ESM S1)?  241 
 242 
(b) Individual variation in payoffs 243 
Since individuals vary in their fitness prospects, a payoff matrix based on reproductive outputs 244 
averaged across the whole population may provide a poor framework for understanding 245 
conflict resolution within individual pairs. Although at a population level penduline tits appear 246 
to be playing a Snowdrift Game, individual pairs of birds may differ in their payoffs from 247 
particular actions and may bargain an outcome depending on their individual traits (and 248 
their particular environmental circumstances). Within each pair, individual characteristics 249 
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such as attractiveness or condition are likely to affect the payoff for a given parental 250 
category. If a male is attractive, for instance, his female partner may be more willing to 251 
care for his offspring [54], whilst the male may benefit more from desertion by finding a 252 
new mate more rapidly than a less attractive male. Similarly, males may be more willing to 253 
care for the offspring of fecund females, while those females may be better at producing 254 
additional clutches. But accounting for such individual differences is to generate precise, 255 
pair-specific predictions of the outcome of individual conflicts over parental care is a very 256 
difficult task.  257 
 Nevertheless, using the available field data on reproductive output for three of 258 
the categories (though never biparental care) for some of the birds may allow us to 259 
generate more accurate predictions than when we only consider the population average 260 
payoff matrix. Here we use an approach based on bootstrapping. The game played by 261 
each pair is represented by the general payoff matrix shown in Table 2a and Table 3a. 262 
Note that in our study population not a single case of biparental care was observed at the 534 263 
nests we investigated, so the payoffs A and a cannot be estimated for any individual. Instead, 264 
we assume that unilaterally deserting a caring partner always yields a higher fitness payoff 265 
than caring (i.e. b > a and B > A). For all other outcomes (male-only care, female-only 266 
care and biparental desertion) we allow the expected payoffs to vary between individuals. 267 
 For most pairs we lack individual payoffs for both the male and the female, so as an 268 
approximation we used a bootstrapping approach to generate a large sample of payoff matrices 269 
from the field data. This involved randomly drawing (with replacement) from the observed 270 
individual payoff values (seasonal number of nestlings) for each parental care category for males 271 
and females. Each bootstrapped matrix was composed of the following values randomly drawn 272 
from the corresponding observed payoffs: one b value drawn from the n = 46 observed male 273 
payoffs under female-only care; one c value from the n = 18 male payoffs under male-only care; 274 
one d value from the n = 47 male payoffs under biparental desertion; one B value from the n = 3 275 
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female payoffs under male-only care; one C value from the n = 52 female payoffs under female-276 
only care; and one D value from the n = 6 female payoffs under biparental desertion. To each of 277 
these values we added a small amount drawn from a random normal distribution with mean 0 278 
and standard deviation 0.01. This was to preclude the occurrence of tied payoffs, which would 279 
otherwise be common in the biparental desertion category since many of these individuals 280 
produced no offspring in the breeding season. We repeated this process until we had generated 281 
5,000 unique bootstrapped matrices from the field data. 282 
There are four possibilities (Table 2b–e) for the type of parental care game being 283 
played by a pair, determined by the particular values of c, d, C and D:  284 
(i)  c < d and C > D: a game in which female-only care is the only ESS; 285 
(ii)  c > d and C < D: a game in which male-only care is the only ESS; 286 
(iii) c < d and C < D: a Prisoner’s Dilemma where biparental desertion is the only ESS; or 287 
(iv)  c > d and C > D: a Snowdrift Game with two ESSs (male-only care and female-only care). 288 
On the basis of our bootstrapped matrices, 21.4% of nests are predicted to have female-only care 289 
(case (i)), 20.1% male-only care (case (ii)) and 9% biparental desertion (case (iii)), while the 290 
remaining 49.5% of pairs will be involved in a Snowdrift Game (case (iv)) from which any of the 291 
three outcomes may result (Table 3a). In the Snowdrift Game we assume that if one of the two 292 
ESSs is payoff dominant, this is the one the pair will adopt. Thus we assume that female-only 293 
care results when b > c and C > B (26.4% of the bootstrapped matrices, in addition to those 294 
from case (i)) and that male-only care results when b < c and C < B (3.4% of the bootstrapped 295 
matrices, in addition to those from case (ii); Table 3a). For 19.7% of the bootstrapped 296 
matrices, the male and female are involved in a Snowdrift Game in which neither equilibrium 297 
is payoff dominant. We consider three possible scenarios for how the conflict is resolved at 298 
these nests: 299 
(1)  Both parents desert the nest. This scenario predicts an additional 19.7% of nests with 300 
biparental desertion (Table 3b). 301 
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(2)  The parents adopt the solution that is payoff dominant at the population level, namely 302 
female-only care (Table 1b). This scenario predicts an additional 19.7% of nests with 303 
female-only care (Table 3b). 304 
(3)  The two ESSs are adopted with equal probability, resulting in female-only care at half of 305 
these nests and male-only care at the remaining half [37]. This scenario predicts an 306 
additional 9.9% of nests with female-only care and an additional 9.9% of nests with 307 
male-only care (Table 3b). 308 
Of these three scenarios for resolving the Snowdrift Game in the absence of payoff 309 
dominance, the first (biparental desertion) best predicts the observed patterns of care, as 310 
this provides the closest match to the pattern of parental care observed in our study 311 
population (Table 3b). The predicted frequencies of female-only care (47.8%) and 312 
biparental desertion (28.7%) are within the natural ranges (ESM S1), although it 313 
overestimates the frequency of male-only care (23.5%, Table 3b). This model, based on 314 
individual variation, is therefore broadly consistent with the observed patterns of care in 315 
our study population, and provides a better fit than the earlier model based on the average 316 
payoff matrix for the population (Section 3a), which predicted female-only care at all nests.  317 
 To test how individual variation may influence the resolution of conflict over care, we ran 318 
our bootstrapped model again, now only including the reproductive payoffs of males of whom we 319 
knew the size of the ‘mask’ (n = 30, n = 10, n = 40 males whose first nest in the season was cared 320 
for by the female, cared for by the male, or biparentally deserted, respectively). From previous 321 
studies we know that the area of the mask is associated with attractiveness of males [38] and with 322 
the parental care decision of males, but not of females [39]: males with larger masks are more 323 
likely to desert, whereas the female’s decision to care or desert does not appear to be influenced 324 
by the size of the male’s mask [39]. We therefore assumed that all males with a larger than 325 
average mask (i.e. > 1.30 cm
2
, n =120 males) would desert, whereas for those males whose mask 326 
was < 1.30 cm
2
 and for the females we assumed that payoff dominance and the Snowdrift Game 327 
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determine parental care as outlined in Table 3a. The predictions of parental care from this model 328 
accounting for individual variation in attractiveness closely resemble the observed pattern of 329 
parental care in penduline tits (Table 3b). 330 
 331 
4. DISCUSSION 332 
We found no evidence that penduline tits are playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma, despite the high 333 
frequency of biparental desertion. At the population level, the payoff matrix based on seasonal 334 
reproductive success is most consistent with an asymmetric Snowdrift Game with two 335 
alternative ESSs, female-only care and male-only care. Female-only care is the payoff-336 
dominant ESS, but this fails to predict the patterns of care in the wild, where more than half of 337 
the nests are either cared for by the male (13.5%) or deserted by both parents (39.1%). We 338 
argue that the population payoff matrix is of little use in explaining observed patterns of care 339 
because expected reproductive payoffs are likely to vary between individuals, and therefore 340 
different pairs may be playing very different games when deciding whether to care or desert. 341 
Our individual-based approach predicts a mixture of parental care strategies, with 342 
frequencies of female-only care and biparental desertion that fall within the observed range in 343 
natural populations (Table 3b, ESM S1). Though largely consistent with observed frequencies of 344 
parental care, our first model overestimates the frequency of male-only care and underestimates the 345 
occurrence of biparental desertion compared to the empirical dataset (Table 3b). In many ways this 346 
mismatch is not surprising, given that we have payoffs only for a subset of individuals in specific 347 
situations. Furthermore, we lack information on the extent to which an individual’s expected 348 
payoffs are correlated across the three different situations (male-only care, female-only care and 349 
biparental desertion), and on the correlation between the male and female payoffs of each pair. 350 
Such information is largely beyond our reach, even for such an intensively studied field system as 351 
this penduline tit population. Nevertheless, our approach based on bootstrapped individual payoffs 352 
highlights the importance of considering individual variation when predicting the behaviour of 353 
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individual pairs instead of applying more conceptual models like the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  354 
The significant deviation of our initial model from the empirically observed pattern 355 
of care could be partly due to stochastic factors affecting some of the payoffs based on 356 
small sample sizes. This may, for example, have been responsible for the overestimate of 357 
the occurrence of male-only care, which was derived from only n = 18 payoffs for males 358 
and n = 3 for females. But the fact that males are more likely to provide care nearer the end 359 
of the breeding season (yet without entailing biparental care [27,42]), for instance, suggests 360 
that there are other factors besides just the strategy-dependent payoffs that are important in 361 
determining which parent will provide care and which will desert.  362 
The discrepancy between predicted and observed patterns of care may be partly 363 
ascribed to individual differences, such as individual quality or environment [36]. To some 364 
extent we took these individual-specific effects into account by replacing the average 365 
fitness payoffs at a population level with individual payoffs. However, a correlation 366 
between individual traits and the different adopted strategies may cause a consistent bias in 367 
the exact payoffs. Attractive males, for instance, may desert not only when their partner stays 368 
behind to care for the offspring but also when the partner already has deserted (as predicted in 369 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma), whereas a less attractive male may be better off caring for the 370 
offspring in the latter case (as predicted in a Snowdrift Game). Such covariance of 371 
individual traits with parental care strategies is likely to influence the outcome of 372 
conflict over parental care. In our final model, we accounted for some potential 373 
correlations between individual traits and reproductive payoffs by including the effect 374 
of male attractiveness on the decision to care or desert. We showed that this 375 
substantially improved our model’s predictions.  376 
We assumed that the parents play a single-shot game because normally each pair 377 
only breeds together once in a breeding season, but in reality they are unlikely to play a 378 
strictly single-shot game. Parents may interact multiple times and repeatedly assess 379 
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each other’s quality before they decide whether to care for the offspring or desert. Such 380 
interactive ‘negotiation’ behaviour likely influences decisions over parental care [55]. 381 
However, although the male’s own parental care decisions are known to be associated 382 
with his body condition or attractiveness, we have no evidence that these male traits 383 
influence the parental care decisions of females [38,43,56]. Additionally, it is worth 384 
noting that Eurasian penduline tit parents spend little time together at the nest during the 385 
period before desertion, making detailed monitoring of each other’s behaviour, such as 386 
has been suggested for St Peter’s fish [20], unlikely [43]. Nevertheless, the interaction 387 
between individual traits and environmental variables (e.g. mating opportunities) may 388 
be complex, and experimental manipulations would be useful for investigating 389 
systematically how these factors combine to influence patterns of parental care.  390 
Balshine-Earn and Earn (1997) also showed in their model that natural variation 391 
between individuals and in the environment could promote the coexistence of different 392 
forms of parental care (see also [47]). A spatially heterogeneous distribution of strategies, 393 
such as desertion in high-quality habitats and care in poor habitats, or vice versa, could 394 
potentially confound the outcome of our analyses. Although it has been suggested that spatially 395 
diverse environments might favour multiple coexisting strategies [46], in earlier work we 396 
found no relationship between parental care category and habitat characteristics [39]. 397 
Nonetheless, it would be worthwhile to investigate the possibility that mating opportunities 398 
might be spatially structured in some way, perhaps resulting in spatial variation in deserting 399 
strategies. Such extrinsic factors, the reputation of the players in the game and occasional 400 
mistakes made by those players may all influence conflict resolution and allow multiple 401 
strategies to persist [12,47,49,57].  402 
In conclusion, we have shown that the resolution of conflict over care is highly 403 
variable and may be strongly influenced by individual differences in the expected 404 
reproductive payoffs for each male–female pair. Using a population payoff matrix to predict 405 
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the behaviour of individual pairs has severe limitations, because this is likely to be a poor 406 
representation of the particular conflict faced by each pair. We recommend the use of 407 
individual-specific information on the reproductive consequences of care decisions to obtain 408 
more accurate predictions of population-level patterns of parental care. 409 
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TABLE CAPTIONS  570 
Table 1. (a) Summary of breeding parameters of Eurasian penduline tits in southern Hungary: number of eggs 571 
and nestlings produced in all first nests (including those of both ringed and unringed individuals) of the breeding 572 
season, with sample size (number of nests) between parentheses; the probability for ringed individuals to have at 573 
least one more successful breeding attempt after the first successful nest (‘successful’ meaning that pair formation 574 
and egg laying took place); the number of subsequent successful breeding attempts; the total number of eggs and 575 
nestlings produced in all subsequent nests; and the seasonal reproductive output (means ± SD). SD of the total 576 
number of nestlings represents the pooled SDs of the first and subsequent nests. (b) Population strategy-577 
dependent seasonal reproductive payoffs for males and females: mean number of nestlings ± SD for males 578 
(below the diagonal) and females (above the diagonal) given the parental category of their first nest in the 579 
breeding season (n is the number of individuals). FC = female care, FD = female desertion, MC = male care, 580 
MD = male desertion. Arrows point from smaller to larger payoffs, representing the direction in which selection 581 
for a parental care strategy would act (dashed arrows indicating our assumption that unilateral desertion always 582 
yields a higher fitness payoff than caring (see §3b), continuous arrows are based on observed values). This 583 
matrix is consistent with that of the Snowdrift Game (see Table 2e). 584 
 585 
Table 2. Reproductive payoff matrices. For comparing alternative actions, arrows point from smaller to larger 586 
payoffs (indicating the expected direction of selection). (a) Generic version; our central assumption is that 587 
unilateral desertion yields a higher payoff for the deserting partner (both male and female) than biparental care (a 588 
behaviour we never observed in our population), i.e. b > a and B > A. (b)–(e) Four specific scenarios for the 589 
different relationships between the payoffs when caring alone (c for males, C for females) and when both parents 590 
desert (d for males, D for females). 591 
 592 
Table 3. (a) Payoff requirements, parental care ESSs and the probability (%) for each ESS. The question mark 593 
(?) indicates the percentage of pairs involved in a Snowdrift Game for which neither of the two ESSs (male-594 
only care or female-only care) was payoff dominant. (b) The expected population strategy for three different 595 
assumptions for ‘?’, i.e. the sum of the proportion predicted by payoff dominance and the proportion 596 
predicted by the Snowdrift Game.  597 
  598 
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Table 1. 599 
(a) 600 
  female-only care male-only care biparental desertion 
  ♂ ♀ ♂ ♀ ♂ ♀ 
fi
rs
t 
no. of eggs 6.37 ± 1.16 (41) 
3.63 ± 2.00 (40) 
3.17 ± 1.27 (12) 
2.20 ± 1.40 (10) 
2.84 ± 1.27 (51) 
0.00 ± 0.00 (65) no. of nestlings 
su
b
se
q
u
en
t 
probability 0.74 0.38 0.06 0.67 0.34 0.83 
no. of nests 1.46 ± 1.39 0.58 ± 0.91 0.06 ± 0.24 0.67 ± 0.58 1.17 ± 1.20 1.33 ± 0.82 
no. of eggs 6.34 ± 6.05 2.61 ± 3.97 0.06 ± 0.24 2.91 ± 2.90 4.49 ± 4.66 7.12 ± 5.00 
no. of nestlings   2.07 ± 2.58 0.95 ± 1.70 0.00 ± 0.00 1.02 ± 1.77 1.54 ± 2.54 2.35 ± 2.90 
to
ta
l no. of nestlings 5.70 ± 3.26 4.58 ± 2.62 2.20 ± 1.40 3.22 ± 2.26 1.54 ± 2.54 2.35 ± 2.90 
 n 46 52 18 3 47 6 
n is the number of individually marked males or females, whereas sample sizes at the first nests of the season (in parentheses) 601 
are the number of nests including those of both ringed and unringed individuals. Sample sizes for the former may be larger 602 
than that for first nests only, because reproductive success for some nests was estimated using population means for a given 603 
strategy (see §2b). 604 
 605 
(b) 606 
 
FC FD 
MC 
          
                            ? 
    
 
 
     ? 
 
3.22 ± 2.26 
(n = 3) 
 
2.20 ± 1.40 
(n = 18) 
MD 
 
 
           4.58 ± 2.62 
       (n = 52) 
 
5.70 ± 3.26 
(n = 46) 
 
2.35 ± 2.90 
(n = 6) 
 
1.54 ± 2.54 
(n = 47) 
 607 
 608 
 609 
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Table 2.  610 
(a)  611 
b > a and B > A 612 
 
FC FD 
MC 
 A 
 
a 
           B 
 
c 
MD 
         C 
 
b 
            D 
 
d 
 613 
(b)     (c) 614 
c < d and C > D     c > d and C < D      615 
single ESS: female-only care  single ESS: male-only care 616 
  
FC FD 
MC 
  
MD 
  
 617 
 618 
(d)     (e)  619 
c < d and C < D     c > d and C > D 620 
single ESS: biparental desertion  two ESSs: female-only care and male-only care 621 
Prisoner’s Dilemma   Snowdrift Game 622 
  
FC FD 
MC 
  
MD 
  
 623 
  624 
 
FC FD 
MC 
  
MD 
  
  
FC FD 
MC 
  
MD 
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Table 3. 625 
 (a) 626 
 627 
 628 
 629 
 630 
 631 
 632 
 633 
 634 
 635 
 636 
 637 
 638 
 639 
 640 
(b) 641 
 female-only care (%) male-only care (%) biparental desertion (%) 
observed parental care ± CI  
(n = 534 pairs) 
47.4 ± 8.6 13.5 ± 6.0 39.1 ± 8.4 
if ? =  biparental desertion 47.8 (21.4 + 26.4) 23.5 (20.1 + 3.4) 28.7 (9.0 + 19.7) 
if ? =  female-only care 67.5 (21.4 + 26.4 + 19.7) 23.5 (20.1 + 3.4) 9.0 (9.0) 
if ? =  50% male-only care and 50% 
female-only care 
57.6 (21.4 + 26.4 + 9.9) 33.4 (20.1 + 3.4 + 9.9) 9.0 (9.0) 
 
if ? = biparental desertion and 
attractive males desert 
 
49.1 (24.4 + 24.7) 
 
8.6 (7.5 + 1.1) 
 
42.3 (22.6 + 19.7) 
 642 
 643 
c < d and C < D 
biparental desertion 
(Prisoner’s Dilemma) 
9.0 
c > d and C < D 
male-only care 
20.1 
c < d and C > D 
female-only care 
21.4 
A 
a 
b d 
D 
B 
c 
C 
c > d and C > D 
Snowdrift Game 
49.5 
b > c and C > B 
female-only care 
26.4 
b < c and C < B 
male-only care 
3.4 
? 
19.7 
53.3 6.9 
39.8 
payoff dominance only 
Snowdrift Game 
 with payoff dominance 
FC FD 
MC 
MD 
